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I. Introduction
One of the central issues in the long-running debate about the Welfare State is its impact
on individual behavior with regard to risk.  Risk-taking is a wellspring of economic growth, and it
has been argued in theory that risk taking can be encouraged by redistributive spending. 
Redistribution can act as a form of income insurance, reducing the downside potential of risky
investments in physical and human capital.  At the same time, the Welfare State distorts decisions
and has well-known efficiency costs; it may displace various forms of private insurance and self-
insurance, so that the net effect of redistribution on risk-taking, savings, and growth is
theoretically ambiguous.  Recent empirical evidence in fact suggests that there is no general
empirical correlation between economic growth and the size of the Welfare State (Lindert, 1996;
Persson and Tabellini, 1994). The deadweight losses of redistribution seem to be offset in practice
by real benefits.  The idea that the Welfare State has real economic benefits is not new, of course,
but it is beginning to receive more practical research attention (e.g. Atkinson, 1995, ch. 6; Barr,
1993, p. 3; Sinn, 1996; Haveman, 1988, Chapter 6; Ringen, 1987).  The object of this paper is to
try to find evidence about the Welfare State’s potential effect on growth through its
encouragement of risk-taking, an effect that has been discussed before but never measured.
There is some indirect evidence on the issue.  Individual pre-tax, pre-transfer income
generally exhibits higher variance than post-tax, post-transfer income (Bird, 1995a).  This implies
that redistribution does seem to have a direct insuring effect on income.  If an insuring effect
exists, there is the possibility that it may induce agents to make their incomes more risky by
undertake riskier activities.  Evidence from simulations (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995) and
cross-section regressions (Bird and Hagstrom, 1997) suggest that redistribution does have some2
affect on risk-taking behavior, by depressing savings.  Individuals who make risky investments in
human capital, say, may build up their savings to hedge their bets.  Thus, again, redistribution may
be providing a cushion that allows individuals to undertake larger economic gambles.  If so, the
Welfare State could be seen as an encouragment to economic growth.  
Ultimately the only way to test whether redistribution affects risk-taking as part of an
individual’s whole income-generating portfolio is to measure the correlation between the
individual’s income risk and measures of redistribution policies where the individual lives.
1  We
have no evidence on the issue now, because the necessary data are unusual.  What is needed is the
correlation between aggregate measures of Welfare State activity, on the one hand, and individual
level measures of the variance of income, on the other. Measuring this correlation requires panel
data, but in order to observe sufficient variation in Welfare State measures it also requires a
dataset that crosses major jurisdictional boundaries, ideally countries.  Until recently comparable
cross-national panel data were limited to two-country pairs, but an ongoing project related to the
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) has generated a seven-country panel data set, the Panel
Comparability Project (PACO).  The paper uses PACO data to explore the level of income risk,
pre- and post-transfer, in the seven countries, and to relate these to various country
characteristics, including redistributive and all-governmental spending.
The method is straightforward.  Each country’s data provides an annual panel of individual
incomes.  A random effects income regression with robust standard errors (“robust RE
regression”) is used to estimate the individual component of annual income variance.  This is done
for pre-transfer income (“market income”) and post-transfer income (“disposable income”).
2  The
difference between market and disposable income risk reveals the impact of transfers on income3
risk, and is called the “insurance effect.”  All of these measures are done separately on each
country’s data, creating country-by-country cross-sections of risk measures and individual
characteristics.  These cross-sections are then combined into one cross-national data set, and
regressions are run of the risk measures on individual and country characteristics.  The country
characteristics that can be included in a given regression are limited by the fact that there are only
seven countries.  Nonetheless the effect of national redistribution efforts can be captured in a
number of different ways, and one can be reasonably confident of results that hold up regardless
of how “Welfare State” effects are defined and tested.
Indeed the results have a very clear pattern: all else equal, income risk seems to be higher
in countries with larger shares of social spending in GDP.  This pattern persists despite significant
variation in the empirical model.  It holds up regardless of the definition of income risk, the
exclusion of different countries in the sample (eastern Europe; Germany), the set of
macroeconomic controls, whether the equation system is considered separate or simultaneous,
and other changes as well.  Such a finding is not inconsistent with evidence found by other
researchers; for example, that income mobility seems to be no lower in countries with large
Welfare States such as Germany as compared to those with small ones, like the U.S. (Burkhauser
and Poupore, 1997).  
Does this mean that the Welfare State induces risk taking?  Not necessarily.  Certainly the
evidence is consistent with this interpretation, but it is also consistent with a competing
interpretation, because the causation may run in the opposite direction.  If voters in high-risk
societies demand more social spending, in order to have more income insurance, then risks and
social spending will be positively correlated.  However, some of the results here seem to argue4
against this interpretation.  It turns out that the insuring effect of the Welfare State seems
unaffected by its scale, because the gap between pre- and post-transfer risk does not depend on
the share of social spending in GDP.  Small Welfare States seem to offer just as much income
insurance protection as big ones.  The patterns of risk are that countries with large Welfare States
have much higher risks in pre-transfer income, and all countries have about the same gap between
pre- and post-transfer income.  As a result, the large Welfare States have much higher risks in
post-transfer income as well.  The higher pre-transfer risk thus seems most likely to be a direct
inducement effect of social spending. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a model of risk-taking with main
result that agents may respond to an increase in redistributive spending by increasing or
decreasing the magnitude of the economic risks they face.  Section III describes the methods and
the data necessary to determine which of these two outcomes occurs in practice.  Section IV
presents results for a single-equation regression model of income risk.  Section V presents results
for a two-equation model of income risk and income mean.  Section VI draws further
implications.
II. A model of risk-taking
The model, derived from Sinn (1996), will be used to determine the response of risk-
taking to changes in the scale of redistribution.  It will become clear than even in a very simple
model the theoretical relationship between these two is ambiguous.  The basic structure is a one-
period model with identical agents with preferences in mean-variance space.  Sinn notes that µ-F
preferences apply to a wide range of problems; in particular it is not necessary to assume normal5
distributions or quadratic preferences.  If all distributions belong to the same linear distribution
class (see Sinn, 1983, 1990), indifference curves in µ-F space will be well-behaved with
appropriate von Neumann-Morgenstern properties.
Each agent enjoys an income W = m - e - L, where m is certain income, L is a potential
loss, and e is “effort” undertaken to reduce loss.  Let L = f(e)Z, where Z is a random variable with
mean EZ and standard deviation RZ.  The function f(e) has f’(e) < 0 and f”(e) $ 0.  It is assumed
that all loss-prevention efforts can be denominated in terms of cash - a minor simplification that
avoids having to model labor choices and the value of time.  In addition the variable Z is assumed
independently and identically distributed across the population.  
Sinn works entirely with a general function f(e) but the comparative static results here will
be more intuitive if a functional form is assumed.  For maximum clarity in the expressions I will
assume a linear form: f(e) = 1-*e.  It will be seen that the value of * will have to be constrained if
the line defining the agent’s opportunity set is to have a sensible slope; for now, assume * a small
positive fraction.
3  
Redistribution occurs through proportional taxation.  Market income is taxed at the rate J
and a lump-sum transfer t is given to all agents.  Post-fisc income becomes Y = W(1-J) + t.
4 
Taking means and variances, expected income is µ = (m - e - (1-*)EZ)(1 - J) + t and the standard
deviation of income is F = (1-J)(1-*e)RZ.  Because the standard deviation of pre-fisc income is
higher, (1-*e)RZ, the model ensures that redistribution lowers income risk (behavior held
constant). 
For an individual the choice of e affects both µ and F according to the equations just
given.  By solving F(e) for e and inserting the result into µ(e), one can obtain the agent’s6
OS: µ(F) ’ ((m&
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opportunity set µ(F): the set of all combinations of µ and F made possible by different choices of
e.  In this case the opportunity set is the curve:
It should be the case that higher levels of expected income can only be purchased by accepting
higher levels of risk; hence the slope of µ(F) should be positive; therefore assume * < EZ
-1. 
Figure 1 depicts the opportunity set, labeled OS.  Increases in loss reduction effort are associated
with movements downward and to the left  - lower mean and lower variance - along the OS line. 
Preferences are indicated by indifference lines; given a certain placement of the opportunity set,
each agent will choose the level of effort that yields a (µ,F) pair such that the utility trade-off
between expected income and income risk equals the rate of transformation of one to the other as
effort increases along OS.
Now consider the tax rate J fixed while t is increased and decreased (the balance of the
government budget is irrelevant to the agent’s choices).  In Equation 1 an increase in t, all else
equal, raises the intercept of the OS line.  Figure 2 depicts a mapping of values of t (t1 < t2 < t3 )
into opportunity sets OS1 to OS3, with a fixed value of J.  The sets differ only in the intercept, and
increases in t simply shift the opportunity set upward.  All else equal, greater transfers allow
agents to choose bundles with higher expected incomes at no increase in risk.  The bundles
actually chosen will depend on preferences, in particular risk aversion.  As transfers shift the
opportunity set from OS1 to OS3, agents with high risk aversion will choose bundles along a
negatively-sloped trajectory, labeled TELH to indicate “transfer expansion line, high risk
aversion.”  The negative trajectory suggests a desire to match increases in expected income with7
µbb ’ (m&e&(1&*e)EZ)(1&J) % J(m&e&(1&*e)EZ) (2)
Fbb ’ (1&J)(1&*e)RZ (3)







reductions in risk.  Agents with low risk aversion (note they are not risk-preferring) will choose a
path of bundles like that depicted in TELL, with a positive trajectory suggesting a willingness to
accept higher risks in order to obtain higher expected income.
5
The agents’ TEL indicates the response of effort (and hence the response of expected
income and income risk) to increases in transfers, holding taxes constant.  For any value of J, the
government must take these responses into account in order to arrive at balanced budget.  In
other words, let J indicate the government’s dedication to redistribution; then a political-
economic equilibrium requires that, given J, the government sets a transfer level t that induces an
amount of effort such that expected net transfers to each agent are zero.  By the law of large
numbers and the similarity of the agents (each choosing the same value of e), the government’s
budget will balance if and only if t = (m - e - EZ)J.  Under this condition, each agent’s expected
income must be:
and the standard deviation of income must be:
Thus the set of µ,F pairs that guarantee a balanced budget will be constrained to lie along the set
BB:8
The balanced-budget set BB has a positive slope that is greater than the slope of a given OS set. 
Increases in redistribution, as measured by J, cause the balanced budget set to rotate counter-
clockwise about its intercept at m - *
-1.  A politico-economic equilibrium is an intersection
between the balanced-budget set and the associated TEL.  As depicted in Figure 3, a fixed value
of J yields a fixed balanced budget set, labeled BB.  With J fixed, the mappings of opportunity
sets and preferences (not shown) yield a series of desired µ-F bundles along the TEL (here only
the high risk-aversion TEL is shown).  As the government changes t it will find that only one level
of transfers balances the budget, namely the level that produces the opportunity set associated
with the choice at point X where the TEL and the BB set intersect.
Within this BB-TEL framework, the impact of redistribution on risk-taking can be easily
shown.  See Figure 4.  An increase in taxes J rotates BB counterclockwise.  From Equation 1 it
can be seen that each opportunity set is shifted downward (assuming m < *
-1), with no impact on
the points of tangency traced out by the TEL.  If as with TELH agents are relatively risk-averse,
the new equilibrium results in a lower value of F; redistribution lowers income risks.  If as with
TELL the agents are relatively less risk-averse, the new equilibrium results in a higher value of F;
redistribution raises income risk.  More properly, increased redistribution induces levels of pre-
tax, pre-transfer income risk that are so high that, despite the risk-reducing effect of the
redistribution, post-tax, post-transfer income risk has increased.  
It is worth stressing that this simple model does not have a fully-specified social welfare
function; there is no deadweight loss.  Thus we cannot conclude that increases in redistribution
improve or degrade social welfare.  What can be shown definitively, however, is that increases in
the scale of redistribution may or may not lower post-tax, post-transfer income risk.  The welfare9
state may indeed induce risk-taking (and perhaps thereby economic growth), as Sinn and others
have argued.  At the same time, individuals living in countries with large welfare states may not be
economically less vulnerable than those living in countries with smaller ones.  Indeed with market
insurance mechanisms readily available in the richest countries, individuals in those countries will
tend to have a status quo bundle with a high value of µ and a low value of F.  If absolute risk
aversion declines with income, agents with such bundles would be relatively willing to accept
increases in risk in order to obtain more expected income.  Thus one might expect that people in
the richest countries live in a world in which all feasible transfer expansion lines are positively-
sloped.  In that case the model would predict that increases in redistribution unambiguously
increase income risk.
III. Method and Data
Determining the empirical effect of redistribution on risk-taking requires two steps.  The
first is to estimate risk, and the second is to relate the estimated risk to country-level measures of
redistribution.
A. Measuring risk
Here risk will be defined as the standard deviation of shocks to yearly individual log
income.  Assume we have data from a single country on N individuals indexed i = 1,..., N, over T
years, indexed t = 1,...,T.  For each individual we have information on annual income Yit, and a
vector of characteristics Xit.  Log income is yit and is assumed to be determined by the equation10
yit ’ " % $Xit % <i % git (5)
with parameters " and $, and error terms < and g independently normally distributed, uncorrelated




i respectively.  In addition E(git gis) = 0 if t ￿ s. 
We approach " + $Xit + <i as the individual’s permanent income and git as the deviation from
permanent income in the current period; note that git contains both permanent and transitory
income shocks, but since the distinction between them is not particularly informative for the main
question here (the relation of all risks, however structured, to redistribution), they will not be
estimated separately.
6  The error term <i is the fixed portion of individual i’s permanent income; it
varies across the population but not across time periods.  For purposes of estimation and
interpretation one should assume that the individual knows the value of <i but the researcher does
not; whereas g is considered a random variable by both parties.  The relevant concept of risk here
involves the income deviations unanticipated by the individual (as opposed to the researcher); it
depends only on the error term git.  Denoting the variance of that term Fi emphasizes that the risks
faced by different individuals will be different; it also implies heteroskedasticity (which will require
modifications to standard error calculations - see below). 
A random effects regression estimates the parameters " and $, as well as the individual-
specific income effects <i.  The residuals from the regression, eit = yit - " ˆ - $ ˆXit - <i, can be squared
and then averaged over the T periods to obtain an estimate of the income variance faced by the
individual: F ˆ
2
i = ET e
2
it/T.  The square root of the estimate yields ˆ Fi, the standard deviation of the
unanticipated income shocks facing this individual, and will be the operational definition of
income risk in what follows.  11
The end result of this step is a cross-section of income risk estimates from a single
country.  Let period s be a single year in that country’s panel (ideally in the middle of the time
series).  Then the variables {Xis, ˆ Fi} form a cross-section sample of individual characteristics
matched with the individual estimates of income risk.  
B. Relating risk to country characteristics
Repeating step A for several countries yields several cross-sections.  In order to keep the
risk estimates comparable across countries, of course, each country’s panel should have
comparable variables and the same length (T).  Pooled, these cross-sections form a cross-national
cross-section of individuals with matched risks and individual characteristics; weights can be used
to ensure that the contribution of each country’s sample is the same even if the number of
observations differ across countries (see below).  The risk estimates are always comparable across
countries because, as shocks to log income, they measure relative percent changes.
7  This has two
implications: the risk estimates are not denominated in terms of currency and will not be affected
by exchange rates; but also, the risk estimates will not be affected by the fact that countries with
higher standards of living will generally have higher absolute levels of risk.
In the pooled sample, regressions of risk on individual characteristics can also include
country-level regressors.  One approach would be to include country dummy variables, but it is
also possible to include a limited number of country characteristics instead.  Of course if there are
C countries in the sample and D of them are indicated by a dummy variable in the regression, only
C - D - 1 country characteristics variables are admissible; adding more results in a singular
variance-covariance matrix.  In practice it is good to keep the number of country characteristics12
Fic ’ " % $Xic % (Zc % gic (6)
substantially less than C - D, since near-singularity makes all results sensitive to small changes in
specification.
Assuming a reasonably robust specification, then, such regressions will indicate how an
individual’s income risk relates to her own characteristics as well as the characteristics of the
country in which she resides:
where the ‘s’ subscript on individual characteristics has now been suppressed, and ‘c’ subscripts
indicate country of residence.  This is a simple cross-section and could be estimated by basic OLS. 
Because of the structure of the PACO sample, however, a large number of additional observations
can be obtained if the assumptions of homoskedastic and independent errors is relaxed (see
below).  The equation will be estimated using weighted OLS with robust Huber-White
(‘sandwich’) standard errors.
8
The risk regressions are most informative if we know that the direction of causation in any
model would be from individual and country characteristics to risks and not vice versa, but there
are good reasons to suppose that causation is not in one direction.  In particular, although we are
interested in testing whether redistribution causes individuals to take on greater risks, citizens in a
country where risks are high may demand more income-insuring redistribution measures.  As a
result a negative correlation between these two would be solid evidence that redistribution
reduces risk-taking, but a positive correlation would not necessarily be evidence that it increases
risk-taking.  At best a positive correlation does not reject the possibility that redistribution
enhances risk-taking and the results will be interpreted in this light.
913
Secondly, the theoretical model in Section II indicates that both income risk and income
mean are choice variables, jointly determined.  Within the context of a two-equation regression
system, the simple single-equation risk regression above is not identified.  The regression can still
be run, of course, but the results have to be interpreted as simple linear correlations in the data,
not as the estimates of a structural model.  Estimating the structural model is frustrated by the fact
that identifying the equations is virtually impossible: it would require variables which affect
income risk and not the income mean.  The data are already somewhat limited in the number of
variables, because of the need within the PACO project to ensure cross-country comparability. 
Within the data, there does not seem to be any way of making uncontroversial identifying
assumptions.  Nonetheless, Section V below will make some questionable assumptions just to
identify a structural model and see whether the results differ significantly from the simple
correlation model.
C. Data
The data are drawn from the Panel Comparability (PACO) database maintained by
CEPS/Instead in Luxembourg.
10  The PACO project takes individual-household income panels
from several countries and harmonizes data definitions to allow the fullest possible cross-national
comparability.  Such a project is obviously difficult, but despite the wide variety of approaches to
data collection in the different countries it has been possible to build a joint dataset of remarkable
breadth and depth.  The PACO countries and years in the release used in this paper include France
1985-1990, Germany (the former west) 1984-1990, Hungary 1992-1994, Luxembourg 1985-
1992, Poland 1987-1990, Great Britain 1991-1993, and the US 1983-1987.
11 The sample’s great14
cross-national variation with respect to social and political institutions is of course very useful for
the present study.  Within each sample are comparable indicators of household structure,
individual employment and education, and income from various sources including transfers. 
There are, however, some important pieces of information that could not be obtained: in the
German data for this release there are no education data, and tax information is not included in the
research design.  Nonetheless the PACO data provide sufficient information to obtain reasonably
accurate estimates of an individual’s yearly income variance, and to compare these estimates
across significantly different socio-political institutions.
Some of the aspects of the PACO data will affect the practical estimation techniques in
noteworthy ways.  The smallest number of years in any panel is three, so for comparability each
risk estimate must be based on T = 3.  Because some countries have significantly more than three
years in the panel, using T = 3 would throw away significant amounts of information.  Instead the
longer panels are broken into two non-overlapping three-year segments.  The full set of three-year
samples is: France A 1985-1987, France B 1988-1990, Germany A 1985-1987, Germany B 1988-
1990, Hungary 1992-1994, Luxembourg A 1987-1989, Luxembourg B 1990-1992, Poland 1988-
1990, Great Britain 1991-1993, and US 1985-1987.  The ‘country dummies’ referred to above
will in fact be sample dummies, separately identifying both the country and the year in which the
observation appears.  Of course since individuals can appear in more than one sample, they are
not independent.  And of course since they are drawn from different countries the errors will not
be homoskedastic; hence the need for robust standard error methods.
There are a number of possible conceptual approaches to weighting the sample.  Each
country’s panel contains individual probability weights, and in general these should be and are15
applied to all the estimation steps.  What is more open to debate in the pooled cross-national data
is whether an individual from Luxembourg should have the same weight as one from the United
States, or whether Luxembourg’s sample as a whole should have the same weight as the US
sample as a whole.  For the research object here the latter weighting scheme seems more
appropriate, since the correlations of most interest are between the levels of income risk in a given
country and the approach to redistribution in that country.  Luxembourg and the US are thus
treated as two distinct and equal units, two observations in the space of Welfare State parameters. 
The individual-level samples are treated as the source of observations about risk in the two
countries.  The practical implication of this conceptual decision is that the sum of weights in the
US sample equals the sum of weights in that from Great Britain; and, because the Luxembourg
data contribute two samples, the sum of weights in both equals one-half of the sum of weights in
the US sample.  
The samples consist of all individuals over age 17 in all households present throughout all
three years of the given sample.
12  Income is assigned to each individual in a household by pooling
the household’s total annual income from all sources and then dividing by an equivalence scale. 
The scale used is based roughly on that used by the German social assistance system: the first
adult counts as one person, each additional adult counts as 0.8 persons, and each child counts as
0.65 persons.  Comparisons using data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS, also
administered by CEPS/Instead) indicate that variations in equivalence scales will affect measured
inequality (and hence probably mobility and risk) within a country but will not affect qualitative
comparisons across countries (Burkhauser, Smeeding, and Merz, 1996).  The German scale was
chosen simply for ease of comprehension: it is straightforward to understand and explain how the16
scale translates household income to individual welfare.
Monetary income values in each country’s sample were first updated to real 1992 currency
using that country’s consumer price index; these were then translated into US dollars using IMF
purchasing power parity rates.  For Poland and Hungary neither step can be done with same
reliability as with the western countries in the sample, in Poland especially since the period 1988-
1990 was one of extremely high inflation.  One approach to these problems would be to consider
these countries too ‘different’ to be included in the study, but alternatively their uniqueness gives
the study’s conclusions greater generality.  In that sense it is valuable to have data from pre- and
post-socialist societies, and from societies facing considerable economic stress.  The benefit of
giving the study this kind of breadth must be weighed against the cost of including data which
have accuracy problems.  In practice the importance of the East European data can be tested by
removing Poland and Hungary from the data and comparing results.
These comments apply to the measures of country characteristics as well.  These were
taken from various sources, principally World Bank publications.  For the East European
countries the regular World Bank/IMF sources do not report values on key items, such as the
share of social spending in GDP.  Fortunately the Bank has conducted specific studies of social
policy in both Poland and Hungary, and statistics reported in these studies can be reliably used
instead (World Bank, 1993, 1995).  
For each individual, several separate estimates of income risk are constructed.  Three
different estimation methods are applied to market and disposable income to produce a total of six
estimates.  The first estimation method is the RE permanent income method outlined in section
III.A. above, and includes in the set of independent variables (to be described momentarily) the17
individual’s years of formal education.  Since the German data do not include information on
education, Version 1 income risk does not exist for Germany.  Version 2 is like Version 1 except
it does not make use of the education variable; Version 2 income risk thus exists for all countries,
including Germany.  Version 3 adopts a simplified approach to estimating risk.  Rather than
conduct a robust RE permanent income regression, the Version 3 method simply detrends the
income path of each individual’s three-year income time series and defines risk as the standard
deviation of income around the trend.  
These six measures of risk are used to construct three additional variables of interest, the
insurance effect of transfers.  Version 1 income insurance is the difference between Version 1
market income risk and Version 1 disposable income risk.  Versions 2 and 3 income insurance are
defined similarly.
The independent variables in random-effects permanent income estimation regressions
have include measures of the individual’s age, sex, work status and hours, industry of occupation
(if any), household structure, number and age of children, marital status, and for regressions
excluding Germany, years of formal education.  Lastly the regressions include age-industry
interactions with a quadratic in age.  Outside the interaction terms, age squared generally is not
significant in any of these regressions so results are reported from versions with age only entered
linearly.  
In the final regressions of risk measures on individual and country characteristics, the
independent variables are roughly the same as in the permanent income regressions, except that
each regression also includes the individual’s market income (in the same version as the dependent
variable) as well as its square, and the individual’s transfer income.  Of course the risk regressions18
contain country- and sample-level regressors as well.
IV. Results for a single-equation model
A. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents medians of the six income risk versions and the derived income insurance
measures by country.  Version 1 risk is not systematically different from Version 2, suggesting
that the omission of education variables is not significant.  Version 3 risk is systematically about
half as large as Version 1 or 2, indicating that if individual’s form subjective expectations on the
basis of their own income path alone, they will systematically expect their incomes to be much
more stable than if they also pay attention to the experiences of others in society.  Across
countries the risk measures have a predictable pattern, with a startling exception.  In general, risks
are highest in the “duress” economies of Poland and Hungary, somewhat lower in the more stable
but more free-market economies of the UK and US, and lowest in western Europe’s more
advanced Welfare States, except for Germany: German pre-transfer incomes exhibit about as
much risk as US incomes.  The same result was found in a previous study of risk in the two
countries, using quite different methods (Bird, 1995a).  
The German transfer system has a relatively low insurance effect, as does Luxembourg’s;
the French system seems to have a larger impact, and the Anglo-Saxon systems have a larger
impact still.  The Hungarian transfer system provides the highest level of insurance.  Every system
provides income insurance in some amount however, and this is a very robust results across the
income versions.  It confirms the basic proposition that redistribution does reduce the variance of
individual incomes.19
Table 2 presents these figures, using Version 2 risk, in the context of country
characteristics as averaged over the length of the respective samples.  The only conclusion that
can be drawn is the absence of any obvious simple connection between country characteristics and
income risk.  On none of the dimensions can countries be ordered by pairs of risks and
characteristics.  The country with the highest social quota (share of social spending in GDP) is
France, which has one of the lower levels of post-transfer risk.  Yet Germany’s Welfare State is
just as large and it has the highest level of post-transfer risk.  
Table 3 provides breakdowns of risk levels by individual characteristics, but excluding
East European data.  The table is meant to reveal the pattern of risks faced by typical individuals
in relatively calm developed economies.  (The social situation in Eastern European countries is
substantially different from that in the west and its impact on risk patterns is worthy of a study of
its own.)  Recall these risk estimates are relative to income; thus it is interesting that this relative
income risk follows an inverted-U shape across the income distribution.  Insurance effects do not;
the poor enjoy the greatest risk-reduction impact, although that of the rich is not zero.  Again
confirming earlier results (Bird, 1995b), the PACO data show that income insurance is distributed
widely in the population, which may explain the breadth of political support for redistribution. 
The remaining patterns are intuitive: Women seem to face higher risks than men, and the old
higher than the young; stable households and nuclear families face lower risks, as do working
individuals as compared to the unemployed.  
B. Risk regressions with sample dummies 
Table 4 presents a base-case regression of disposable (post-transfer) income risk on20
individual characteristics and sample dummies; the means and standard deviations of the variables
are included to assist the substantive assessment of the coefficients.  (The mean pre-transfer
equivalent income of 1.804 translates to about $6,000 in 1992 US dollars.)  A number of other
regressors are not shown, including industry dummies and industry-age interactions.  The income
coefficients suggest that risk follows an inverted-U pattern, but with a negative slope throughout
the range of observed log incomes.  Thus risks fall with income but at a decreasing rate.  The
transfer income suggests comfortingly that the transfer system is itself not more capricious in
providing income than the market.  Most of the other variables follow intuitive patterns, although
risks seem not to differ significantly by sex, once other variables are taken into account.  Risk
rises with age and falls with hours of employment; individuals in larger households, married
households, and stable households (non-splitting) experience lower risks.  Of these, the effect of
not changing households is by far the greatest, indicating that a greater source of economic
vulnerability is unstable family relations rather than employment or capital market changes.  
The last part of the table gives the sample ID dummies, and reveal some counter-intuitive
patterns.  All of the coefficients express the risk level in the sample as compared to the US
sample.  First, as one would expect, the US is among the highest-risk economies, with most of the
others having risks significantly lower.  The mean of the dependent variable here is 0.193 (i.e.
there is usually no more than a 40 percent income swing in a given year).  The sample dummies
indicate that the relative standard deviation of income shocks in the US is about 2 percentage
points higher than in the UK, 7 points higher than in France, 9 points higher than in Luxembourg,
14 points higher than in Poland, and 26 points higher than in Hungary.  Only in Germany are risks
higher than the US, in one sample 3 points higher and in the other 9 points higher.  In substantive21
terms these effects are very large relative to individual characteristics; for example, a 20-year-old
faces risks only about 1.2 percentage points lower than a 50-year-old, and increasing income from
the mean by an entire standard deviation (translating from logs, it implies a tripling of income in
levels) only lowers risk by 6.8 percentage points.  The implication is that individual income risks
are more powerfully shaped by socio-economic institutions than that by measurable individual
characteristics.
13  
Table 5 explores the robustness of these patterns to variations in the approach to risk. 
Only a selection of the most important coefficients is shown.  The first column uses Version 1
income risk, which includes data on education but excludes the German sample.  Adding five
years of formal education increases income risks by about 2.7 percentage points, so one
implication of graduate school is a small but measurable increase in the riskiness of lifetime
income.  Otherwise the coefficients follow a very similar pattern to those in Table 3, indicating
that the omission of education from the measure of Version 2 risk has little substantive impact. 
The second column tests the importance of omitting the German sample from column 1; it re-runs
the base-case Version 2 regression without the German data, revealing very little substantive
change in the patterns (with the possible exception of age, which become even less meaningful
than before, and sex, which now shows a slightly higher but statistically insignificant risk for
women).  The third column in Table 5 runs the base regression on Version 3 income, with no
difference in the patterns.  The size of the coefficients is systematically different, of course,
because the mean of the dependent variable is lower.  The Version 3 regression has a substantially
worse fit (the R-squared is .1079 as opposed to .1562 for the base case), no doubt a result of the
its non-use of cross-sectional information in estimating risk.  22
Table 6 returns to Version 2 income.  The third column simply repeats the base case
regression from Table 3, while the first column shows a regression of pre-transfer risk, and the
second shows a regression of the income insurance effect.  The patterns are revealing of the
targeting of income insurance.  For example, we see that pre-transfer risk declines at a declining
rate with respect to income, and it contributes this pattern to post-transfer risk.  Yet the income
insurance effect has an opposite pattern, rising at a decreasing rate across the income distribution,
in effect amplifying the income-related decline in pre-transfer risk.  Similarly, pre-transfer risk
rises with age but the insurance effect falls with age, again amplifying rather than dampening the
market’s distribution of risk.  Working in the other direction, the pre-transfer risks faced by
women are higher than those faced by men, but the income insurance system wipes the difference
out.  Also, those receiving higher transfer incomes face significantly higher pre-transfer risks, but
the transfers hedge so much of it that post-transfer risk falls with transfers.  A neutral effect of the
insurance system is found with respect to some variables; for example, changing households
greatly increases pre-transfer risks but only slightly increases the insurance effect, so that post-
transfer risk remains quite high.
In terms of country effects, Table 6 reveals that the cross-country pattern of post-transfer
income risk is largely derived from the pattern of pre-transfer income risk; no country’s income
insurance system changes its standing in the world with respect to risk.  The ordering, from
highest risk to lowest, is Germany, US, UK, France, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary.  Except for
Germany the ordering seems to suggest that the relatively smaller anglo-saxon Welfare States do
the most to encourage risk, the continental welfare states less so, and socialist and post-socialist
systems least of all.  But of course there is no reason to assign the ordering to Welfare State23
structure, since the countries differ on so many other dimensions.  Nonetheless, except for
Germany, this ordering seems to support the conventional wisdom that the relatively free-market
Anglo-US system emphasizes risk-taking while the more protective continental system
encourages security.  There are three reasons, however, not to simply stop with this conclusion. 
First is the clear exception of Germany, with its high risks that have been corroborated elsewhere
in the literature (e.g. Burkhauser and Poupore, 1997).  Second is the fact that the US transfer
system, limited though it may be, seems to offer the greatest insurance effect (column 2).  Third is
the possibility that this simple ordering is produced not by the Welfare State but by other facets of
the countries: their size, per capita income, growth rate, etc.
C. Risk regressions with country characteristics
To expose the effect of specific aspects of the different countries, the regressions are run
without sample dummies but with aggregate country characteristics.  To obtain a reasonable fit on
the country characteristics, the number of country variables in a regression will be limited to
four.
14  The macro variables should measure the level of redistribution, the state of the business
cycle, the wealth of the economy, and the dependence of the economy on world trade.  The base-
case measures of these four aspects are the social quota (share of social spending in GDP), the
unemployment rate, real GDP per capita in US dollars, and real GDP in US dollars.  The set of
macro variables will be changed to test for the robustness of any conclusions.
Table 7 presents regressions of pre- and post-transfer risk, and the income insurance
effect, on the individual-level variables contained in Table 6 but replacing the sample dummies
with these four country characteristics.  The results indicate that, all else equal, risks are higher in24
countries with larger social quotas and in the larger economies; they are lower at the trough of the
business cycle and in wealthier economies.  The pattern of individual-level effects is largely
unchanged.  Using the mean country characteristics in Table 2 we can assess the substantive
significance of these coefficients.  A increasing the social quota from the US level to that of
France/Germany would increase pre-transfer risk by about 50 percentage points, obviously a very
large increase and much larger than any of the individual-level effects.  Increasing the economy
size from France to the US has a similarly-sized positive effect.  Decreasing the unemployment
rate from 9.9 in France to 7.4 in the US increases risk by only 5.6 percentage points, however,
and increasing per capita income from the French level to the American reduces risks by only 6.2
percentage points.  Thus the large effects in the sample dummies seem to have been produced
primarily by the Welfare State on the one hand and the economy size on the other; wealth and the
business cycle seem less important.  Nonetheless the Welfare State effect is in the opposite
direction as one would have concluded from the sample dummies: the larger welfare states in
continental Europe seem to encourage risk.
It is worth noting also that these patterns of pre-transfer risk are translated almost directly
into similar patterns of post-transfer risk; the insurance effect of transfers is not substantively
significant.  For example, pre-transfer risk rises with the social quota, but income insurance also
rises with the social quota; therefore it is possible that the insurance effect might counteract the
pre-transfer risk and leave post-transfer risk lower in countries with large social quotas.  The
results indicate, however, that the impact of larger social quotas on the insurance effect is quite
small (.0023), less than one-tenth as large as their impact on pre-transfer risk (0.0341).  Hence on
net the social quotas increase post-transfer risk, indeed by an amount almost as large (0.0318) as25
their effect on pre-transfer risk.
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Another surprising implication of the small social quota coefficient in the income insurance
regression ($ = .0023) is that the insuring effect of transfers does not seem to depend strongly on
the size of the Welfare State.  Of course, at some level there has to be an effect: going from
having no Welfare State to having one at the smallest level (here, the US at 14 percent of GDP)
must do something to create an insurance effect, since the insurance effect is present and positive
throughout the sample of individuals.  But it may be the case that once a Welfare State is
established - a basic system of safety nets, means-tested benefits and social insurance programs -
further increases in the scale of the programs has very little effect on the programs’ income
insuring effect.  
The next three tables offer a series of tests of the robustness of these conclusions.  Given
that pre-transfer risk patterns generally translate strongly into post-transfer risk patterns, the focus
for sensitivity will be on the post-transfer regressions.  The first direction of sensitivity testing is
to change the sample; column one in Table 8 repeats column 3 of Table 7 but leaves out Poland
and Hungary, while column 2 switches to Version 1 income and drops the two German samples. 
In both cases the effect is to weaken the substantive impact of the social quota and transfer some
of it to the other three variables.  Nonetheless the patterns are the same: the positive effect of the
Welfare State on risk levels is not an artifact of including eastern European countries in the
sample, nor is it produced by the odd case of Germany, the continental welfare state with high
levels of risk.  
Next we explore the conjecture of Sinn (1996) that it is all governmental activity, and not
the social spending per se, that is the relevant measure of redistribution at the national level. 26
Table 9 replaces the social quota variable with the share of government spending in GDP, with an
opposite outcome.  Column 1 repeats column 3 of Table 7; columns 2 and 3 repeat columns 1 and
2 of Table 8 respectively.  In the whole sample (column 1), risks rise with the size of government,
although more weakly than with social spending alone; this perhaps reflects the greater
progressivity of social spending.  The same pattern is observed when east European countries are
removed (column 2), although when Germany is removed (column 3) the effect of government
expenditure on risk is negative.  
Finally Table 10 presents regressions with other sets of macroeconomic variables.  The
coefficient on the social quota is much smaller here but is still positive and statistically significant. 
The smallest coefficient ($ = .0014) is in the regression in column 3, which uses GDP pre capita,
the export share, and GDP growth as the controlling macroeconomic variables.  It implies that
moving from the US social quota to the French would raise risks by 1.9 percentage points. 
To check macro-level robustness in an entirely atheoretical way, one can identify eight
macro-level variables that could conceivably be considered as determinants of income risk and
then regress Version 2 disposable risk on the social quota and all possible three-element
combinations of these eight variables.  The eight variables are the unemployment rate, the
percentage of GDP received from exports, the inflations rate, the annual change in real GDP, the
dependency ratio (the share in total population of the population age 18 and below or age 65 and
above), real GDP, real GDP per capita, and the share of government spending in GDP.  The
permutations produce 56 regressions.  All but thirteen of these (77 percent) produce positive and
statistically significant coefficients on the social quota variable.  Of the thirteen where social quota
has a negative effect on risk, nine are regressions that also included the government GDP share; in27
each of these cases the coefficient on the government share is positive and statistically significant. 
The finding that government activity does something to increase risk-taking thus seems very
robust to variations in macro-level controls.  The mean coefficient on the social quota is
0.007051, which implies that a ten-point increase in the social quota would produce a 37 percent
increase in disposable income risk.
The same exercise offers strong evidence that this effect is causal.  Running 56 regressions
of the Version 2 Insurance Effect on the social quota and all possible permutations of the other
macro variables strongly suggests that the insurance effect is not significantly related to the size of
the Welfare State.  In 34 of the regressions (61 percent), the coefficient on the social quota is
negative: increasing the Welfare State from its current scale among developed countries produces
less and not more income insurance at the margin.  However, the average coefficient is -0.00014,
with the result that a 10-point increase in the social quota would reduce the insurance effect of
social spending by only 3 percent.  One can conclude that Welfare States of the size range
covered in this sample (14 - 28 percent of GDP), will not become more effective agents of income
insurance simply by increasing scale.  It follows that voters perceiving high pre-transfer risks
would have little incentive to demand an increase in social spending from these levels; such added
spending would not reduce their risks.   Thus it is probably not the case that high risks have
caused political pressures that lead to high spending; rather, it is more likely that high spending
and the security it affords have led people to take more risks.  
V. Simultaneous equation model of income mean and income variance
Next, consider a set of assumptions that identify a two-equation system of income mean28
and income variance.
16  Let income risk be affected by all the variables included in the single-
equation regressions above, but excluding: 1) transfer income and the square of pre-transfer
income, and 2) industry dummies and age-industry interactions.  The “income mean” is the value
of permanent post-transfer income that has been estimated for the individual respondent.  Let it
be affected by all the variables in the single-equation risk regression, including income risk but
excluding: 1) transfer income, pre-transfer income, and the square of pre-transfer income, and 2)
children variables (number of kids, age of youngest and oldest).  Thus risk is affected by the
presence of children but not by the industry of employment, and mean is affected by industry but
not the presence of children.  It would be difficult to defend these assumptions on theoretical
grounds, but they are probably the best available.  Some such problematic assumptions are
necessary simply to identify the two-equation model and test for its resemblance to single-
equation results.  
Table 11 shows in fact that there is very little difference in moving to a two-equation
system.  The first column shows the results for a single-equation risk regression including the
industry dummies.  Column 2 simply removes the industry dummies to show their impact on the
other coefficients.  Column 3 presents the results of the risk equation in the two-equation system. 
The column 3 coefficient on permanent post-transfer income is larger in absolute value than the
others, indicating that the endogeneity of the average income level is substantively important. 
However, none of the other coefficients seem greatly affected.  Note especially that the coefficient
on social spending in GDP (SQUO) is virtually unchanged across the columns.  
Thus while the single-equation results in Section IV cannot be viewed as identified
parameters of a two-equation system, they do not seem to differ substantially from those29
parameters - which we have identified, if only with rough assumptions.  Unfortunately, for this
kind of problem it seems unlikely that one could find identifying assumptions that are more
acceptable.  Thus there are two reasons to believe that the single-equation results provide virtually
all the reliable information that can be gleaned from the data: 1) because they produce results
similar to a two-equation system, and 2) because no two-equation system would be worthy of
great confidence due to the questionable assumptions behind it.
VI. Summary and interpretation
In a cross-national data set of individual and country characteristics, the annual variance of
log disposable income is positively correlated with the share of social spending in GDP.  While it
may be the case that individuals in high-risk countries exert more pressure to expand the level of
social spending, the data also indicate that the insuring effect of social spending is not strongly
related to changes in the amount of the spending within the scale of spending levels studied here. 
It seems more likely that the causation runs in the other direction: social spending induces
behavior and encourages institutions that increase the level of economic risk in society.
Thus it seems that the Welfare State does induce risk-taking.  The results have also shed
light on the microeconomic mechanisms whereby this risk-taking might occur.  For example,
maintaining stable household relationships is second only to income among the important
determinants of risk.  Household structure is certainly endogenous, and risk is also shown to be
affected by a number of other endogenous items: education, work hours, home ownership.  It
seems reasonable to suppose that the positive risk effects picked up by country-level variables are
at least to some extent reflective of unmeasured individual decisions.  If so, then the results30
support the argument that the Welfare State, through its positive effect on economic stability,
encourages risk-taking and thereby economic growth.31
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France Germany Hungary Luxem-
bourg
Poland UK US
     Version 1
a 0.135 --- 0.227 0.091 0.190 0.174 0.183
     Version 2 0.133 0.190 0.225 0.091 0.189 0.174 0.188





     Version 1 0.111 --- 0.151 0.079 0.175 0.142 0.151
     Version 2 0.112 0.180 0.146 0.080 0.174 0.142 0.150
     Version 3 0.052 0.076 0.076 0.039 0.114 0.058 0.067
Insurance Effect:
b 
     Version 1 0.024 --- 0.076 0.012 0.015 0.032 0.032
     Version 2 0.021 0.010 0.079 0.011 0.015 0.032 0.038
     Version 3 0.007 0.003 0.024 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.008
Notes: Table reports medians of individual-level income risk measures within large national
samples of individuals.  Sample sizes vary by country and income definition and are weighted - see
text.  
a) “Version 1" defines income risk as the standard deviation of the residual from a random-effects
regression of log income on household and individual characteristics, including education; the
German data have no education information.  “Version 2" is the same except that it excludes
education.  “Version 3" is the simple standard deviation of log income around its three-year time
trend.  “Income” here is the equivalent income per person in the household, in thousands of 1992
US dollars.  
b) The “insurance effect” is the difference between the median standard deviation of pre-transfer
income and the median standard deviation of post-transfer income.
Source: PACO34
Table 2. Income Risks and Country Characteristics
France Germany Hungary
Luxem-








0.112 0.180 0.146 0.080 0.174 0.142 0.150
Insurance Effect 2
a 0.021 0.010 0.079 0.011 0.015 0.032 0.038
Real GDP (1992
$US billions)
988 1,137 61 9 229 929 5,194
Real GDP per
capita (1992 $US)
17,680 18,460 5,900 23,260 6,040 16,080 21,770
Annual GDP
Growth Rate (%)
2.76 2.77 0.45 4.91 -0.30 0.30 3.80
Unemployment
Rate (%)
9.9 6.3 11.6 1.9 0.9 9.9 7.4
Inflation Rate (%) 3.1 1.5 21.8 3.2 286.2 2.6 3.3
Share of GDP
from Exports (%)
22.5 32.2 29.4 86.4 4.9 26.4 7.92
Social Quota
b (%) 28.1 28.0 23.5 26.2 15.7 26.5 14.3
Government
Expenditure Share
in GDP 41.2 48.7 60.5 36.4 43.2 41.8 23.0
Time Period 85-90 84-90 91-94 85-92 87-90 91-93 83-87
a) Measures refer to income version 2; see Table 1.  
b) Share of social spending in GDP.
Sources: World Bank; International Monetary Fund; PACO.  Currency amounts converted to
$US using IMF estimated purchasing power parities.  35
Table 3. Income Risk and Individual Characteristics












All 0.149 0.126 0.023
Income:
b
     Below ½ median 0.223 0.173 0.050
     ½ - 1.5 times median 0.146 0.122 0.024
     1.5 - 3.0 times median 0.130 0.110 0.020
     More than 3.0 times median 0.188 0.169 0.019
Sex:
Men  0.142 0.123 0.019
Women 0.157 0.130 0.027
Education (no German data):
     8 years or less 0.126 0.100 0.026
     9 to 12 years 0.146 0.120 0.026
     More than 12 years 0.143 0.124 0.019
Age:
     18-25 0.148 0.126 0.022
     26-35 0.125 0.113 0.012
     36-55 0.129 0.116 0.013
     56-75 0.217 0.164 0.053
     76 and higher 0.264 0.165 0.099
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Table 3. (Continued) Income Risk and Individual Characteristics












All 0.149 0.126 0.023
Household Stability:
     Stable Household 0.148 0.125 0.023
     Household Split 0.266 0.222 0.044
Household Type:
     Single Person 0.199 0.156 0.043
     Two Adults, No Kids 0.180 0.144 0.036
     Two Adults, Kids 0.127 0.113 0.014
     Lone Parent 0.208 0.155 0.053
     Three-Generation 0.136 0.116 0.020
Work Status:
     Working Now 0.129 0.118 0.011
     Unemployed 0.240 0.178 0.062
   
Observations: 44,147, including 14,220 Germans who are not included for education calculations. 
Results are weighted medians, using country-level weighting schemes; all weights are adjusted so
that each country’s sample has the same total weight.
a) Income risk measures are based on Version 2 - See table 1.
b) “Income” is permanent real income (1992 $US) in thousands per person in the individual’s
household, as adjusted by an equivalence scale.37
Table 4. OLS Regression of Post-Transfer Income Risk on
Individual Characteristics and Sample Identifiers
Dependent variable is the standard deviation of the residual from random effects income








Pre-transfer income 1.804 1.181  -.1277  *.0052
(Income^2)/1000 .005 .004 14.5768  *1.0073
Transfer income .251 .422 -.1477  *.0052
Weekly work hours (I) 18.424 22.009 -.0003  *.0001
Work status = employed (I) .630 .483 -.0107  *.0035
Work status = unemployed (I) .040 .196 .0034  .0054
Age 42.707 16.527 .0004  *.0001
Sex = female .517 .500 -.0004 .0026
Relation to Head (I): Head .480 .500 .0217  *.0034
     Spouse .302 .459 .0161  *.0037
     Cohabitor .017 .130 .0177  *.0083
Family status (I): Married .508 .500 -.0252  *.0031
     Divorced 0.41 .199 -.0003 .0061
Did the respondent change
households in past year = yes  .153 .360 .1107  *.0128
HH structure: Lone parent .049 .217 .0217  *.0056
     Three-generation .058 .235 -.0157  *.0040
     Two adults, children  .494 .500 -.0080  *.0031
     Two adults, no children .204 .403 .0137  *.0038
No. of children in household .799 1.063 -.0097  *.0017
Age of youngest child 3.645 5.406 -.0010  *.0005
Age of oldest child 4.840 6.363 -.0003 .0005
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Table 4 Continued. OLS Regression of Post-Transfer Income Risk on








Do the residents own the home? =
yes 0.684 .465 .0154  *.0023
SAMPLE DUMMIES
a
France 1986 1/14 .258 -.0718  *.0053
France 1989 1/14 .258 -.0755  *.0057
Germany 1985 1/14 .258 .0874  *.0056
Germany 1989 1/14 .258 .0277  *.0052
Hungary 1992 1/7 .350 -.2619  *.0148
Luxembourg 1986 1/14 .258 -.0938  *.0039
Luxembourg 1991 1/14 .258 -.0859  *.0035
Poland 1989 1/7 .350 -.1376  *.0063
United Kingdom 1992 1/7 .350 -.0189  *.0035
Constant 1 -- .4416  *.0109
Source: PACO.  N = 51,810, weighted to 70,000.  R
2 = .1562.
Notes: Simple OLS regression with robust Huber-White (‘sandwich’) standard errors.  A ‘*’
indicates statistical significance at the .05 confidence level, two-tail test.  The regression also
includes industry dummies interacted with a quadratic in age.  Where it is not clear from the
variable name, an (I) indicates the variable is an individual-level variable (as opposed to
household-level).  All incomes are permanent log income per capita in the respondent’s
household, adjusted by an equivalence scale, in thousands of real 1992 US$.  For “Relationship to
Head” the omitted category is “other family members.”  For marital status, the omitted category is
“single or widowed.”  For household structure, the omitted category is “single-person
household.”  For sample dummies, the omitted category is “United States 1986.”  
a) Each country’s weights are adjusted so that the country’s samples contributes an equal share
(1/7) of information to the estimates.  When there are two separate samples from the same
country (France, Germany, Luxembourg), each sample receives ½ of the country weight, i.e.
1/14.39
Table 5. OLS Regressions of Different Versions of Post-Transfer Income Risk 
Dependent variables are measures of income risk in terms of standard deviation of log income.
 Version 1: RE, no
educ. or German
data.  








Mean .107, sd .134
Variable Coef.  S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Pre-transfer income -.1316  *.0060 -.1224  *.0057 -.0645 .0053
(Income^2)/1000 11.1307  *.9336 11.7349  *.9268 5.6778 1.0125
Transfer income -.1556  *.0068 -.1423  *.0064 -.0721 .0053
Education (years) .0053  *.0005 -- -- -- --
Age .0001 .0001 -4.24e-5 9.92e-5 .0002 .0001
Sex = female -.0005 .0026  -.0015 .0026 -.0017 .0024
Did the respondent
change households in
past year = yes  .0986  *.0128 .1019  *.0127 .0883  *.0119
SAMPLE DUMMIES
France 1986 -.0754  *.0052 -.0811  *.0052 -.0199  *.0082
France 1989 -.0763  *.0058 .0795  *.0058 -.0567  *.0047
Germany 1985 -- -- -- -- .0287  *.0046
Germany 1989 -- -- -- -- .0104  *.0052
Hungary 1992 -.2691  *.0154 -.2646  *.0152 -.1677  *.0139
Luxembourg 1986 -.0933  *.0040 -.0983  *.0040 -.0603  *.0031
Luxembourg 1991 -.0794  *.0037 -.0883  *.0035 -.0471  *.0029
Poland 1989 -.1580  *.0074 -.1464  *.0073 -.0596  *.0057
United Kingdom 1992 -.0152  *.0036 -.0206  *.0035 -.0182  *.0030
R
2 .1393 .1322 .1079
Notes: See previous tables for notes.  Regressions also include information on: work status,
industry (interacted with a quadratic in age), relationship to head, household structure, and
children.  Observations: Column 1: 37,008, Column 2: 37,590, Column 3: 32,812.40














Coef.  S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Pre-transfer income   -.1017  *.0058 .0260  *.0044  -.1277  *.0052
(Income^2)/1000 11.2957  *1.1656 -3.2811  *.8972 14.5768  *1.0073
Transfer income  .0614  *.0080 .2092  *.0063 -.1477  *.0052
Weekly work hours -.0004  *.0001 -.0001 5.38e-5 -.0003  *.0001
Work status =
employed -.0049 .0042 .0058  *.0026 -.0107  *.0035
Work status =
unemployed .0392  *.0078 .0357  *.0055 .0034  .0054
Age .0002  *.0001 -.0003  *8.72e-5 .0004  *-.0001
Sex = female .0022 .0032 .0026 .0022 -.0004 .0026
Relation to Head: Head .0200  *.0045 -.0017 .0032 .0217  *.0034
     Spouse .0153  *.0049 -.0008 .0035 .0161  *.0037
     Cohabitor .0166 .0100 -.0011 .0057 .0177  *.0083
Family status: Married -.0242  *.0040 .0011 .0027 -.0252  *.0031
     Divorced .0149 .0080 .0151  *.0054 -.0003 .0061
Did the respondent
change households in
past year = yes  .1352  *.0141 .0246  *.0094 .1111  *.0128
CONTINUED NEXT PAGE41














Coef.  S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
HH structure: Lone
parent .0214  *.0068 -.0003 .0047 .0217  *.0056
 Three-generation -.0070 .0057 .0087  *.0043 -.0157 .0040
 Two adults, children  .0022 .0040 .0102  *.0028 -.0080  *.0031
 Two adults, 0 children .0146  *.0049 .0010 .0032 .0137  *.0038
No. of children in
household -.0101  *.0022 -.0005 .0016 -.0097  *.0017
Age of youngest child 3.24e-5 .0006 .0010  *.0004 -.0010  *.0005
Age of oldest child -.0011 .0007 -.0013  *.0004 -.0003 .0005
Do the residents own
the home? = yes .0098  *.0029 -.0056  *.0019 .0154  *.0023
SAMPLE DUMMIES
France 1986 -.0959  *.0061 -.0241  *.0036 -.0718  *.0053
France 1989 -.0931  *.0071 -.0176  *.0049 -.0755  *.0057
Germany 1985 .0706  *.0063 -.0167  *.0029 .0874  *.0056
Germany 1989 .0135  *.0059 -.0142  *.0027 .0277  *.0052
Hungary 1992 -.2795  *.0165 -.0176 .0109 -.2619  *.0148
Luxembourg 1986 -.1359  *.0054 -.0421  *.0033 -.0938  *.0039
Luxembourg 1991 -.1225  *.0054 -.0366  *.0041 -.0859  *.0035
Poland 1989 -.1605  *.0072 -.0229  *.0042 -.1376  *.0063
United Kingdom 1992 -.0341  *.0047 -.0152  *.0028 -.0189  *.0035
R
2 .1854 .2971 .1562
N: 51,810.  Regressions based on income Version 2.  See notes to previous tables.  42
Table 7. Regressions of Risk and Insurance, with Country Characteristics
DV: Pre-Transfer
Income Risk
Mean .241, sd .239
DV: Income
Insurance
Mean .048, sd .145
DV: Post-Transfer
Income Risk
Mean .193, sd .195
Variable Coef.  S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Pre-transfer income  -.0900  *.0057 .0264  *.0043 -.1164  *.0050
(Income^2)/1000 11.055  *1.1485 -3.2232  *.8839 14.2779  *.9907
Transfer income .0713  *.0078 .2101  *.0062 -.1388  *.0051
Age .0003  *.0001 -.0003  *8.69e-5 .0006  *.0001
Sex = female .0033 .0032 .0025 .0022 .0007 .0026
Did the respondent
change households in
past year = yes  .1049  *.0080 .0293  *.0049 .0755  *.0070
HH structure: Lone
parent .0194  *.0069 -.0003 .0047 .0197  *.0056
 Three-generation -.0115  *.0057 .0084 .0043 -.0199  *.0040
 Two adults, children  -.0027 .0040 .0101  *.0028 -.0128  *.0031
 Two adults, 0 children .0134  *.0049 .0009 .0032 .0125  *.0039
MACRO VARIABLES
(Group A)
Social Quota (%) .0341  *.0010 .0023  *.0005 .0318  *.0009
Unemployment (%) -.0222  *.0010 -.0009 .0005 -.0214  *.0009
Real GDP per capita
(1992 $US thousands) -.0151  *.0006 -.0020  *.0003 -.0131  *.0005
Real GDP 
(1992 $US trillions) .1165
 
*.0032 .0126  *.0017 .1038  *.0028
R
2 .1736 .2968 .1390
N: 51,810.  Regressions based on income Version 2.  Regressions also include information on:
work status, industry (interacted with a quadratic in age), relationship to head, and children.  See
notes to previous tables.  43
Table 8. Short-Sample Regressions of Risk and Insurance, with Country Characteristics
DV: Post-transfer
Income Risk
Mean .195, sd .216
DV: Post-Transfer
Income Risk






Variable Coef.  S.E. Coef. S.E.
Pre-transfer income  -.1580  *.0077 -.1132  *.0058
(Income^2)/1000 21.6319  *1.5238 10.5110  *.9245
Transfer income -.1486  *.0078 -.1358  *.0066
Education (years) — — .0048  *.0005
Age .0006 .0001 .0002 .0001
Sex = female 9.40e-6 .0035 -.0002 .0026
Did the respondent
change households in
past year = yes  .1193  *.0127 .0207  *.0096
HH structure: Lone
parent .0185  *.0063 -.0098 .0059
 Three-generation -.0156  *.0055 -.0133  *.0041
 Two adults, children  -.0150 .0039 -.0174  *.0033
 Two adults, 0 children .0084  *.0047 .0057 .0041
MACRO VARIABLES
Social Quota (%) .0243  *.0009 .0190  *.0018
Unemployment (%) -.0373  *.0013 -.0105  *.0015
Real GDP per capita
(1992 $US thousands) -.0332  *.0011 -.0061  *.0008
Real GDP 
(1992 $US trillions) .0978
 




Regressions also include information on: work status, industry (interacted with a quadratic in
age), relationship to head, and children.  See notes to previous tables.44
Table 9. Regressions of Risk on Government GDP Share
DV: Post-Transfer
Income Risk
Mean .193, sd .195
DV: Post-Transfer
Income Risk
Mean .195, sd .216
DV: Post-Transfer
Income Risk
Mean .178, sd .164
Sample All countries No east European
countries
Excluding Germany
Variable Coef.  S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Pre-transfer income  -.1132  *.0051 -.1565  *.0077 -.1165  *.0059
(Income^2)/1000 13.5185  *1.001 21.2582  *1.5226 10.9325  *.9308
Transfer income -.1432  *.0052 -.1471  *.0059 -.1353  *.0066
Education (years) — — — — .0049  *.0005
Age .0005 .0001 .0006  *.0001 .0002 .0001
Sex = female -.0002 .0026 .0001 .0034 2.6e-5 .0026
Did the respondent
change households in
past year = yes  -.1270  *.0059 .1197  *.0126 .0570  *.0122
HH structure: Lone
parent .0167  *.0057 .0180  *.0063 .0099  *.0058
 Three-generation .0191  *.0040  .0158  *.0055 -.0142  *.0041
 Two adults, children  -.0154 .0032 -.0152  *.0039 -.0167  *.0033
 Two adults, 0 children .0167  *.0039 .0086   .0047 .0054  *.0041
MACRO VARIABLES
Gov’t share in GDP (%) .0097  *.0004  .0102  *.0004 -.0162  *.0015
Unemployment (%) -.0017  *.0004 -.0110  *.0010 .0164  *.0011
Real GDP per capita
(1992 $US thousands) .0077   *.0004 -.0046  *.0011 -.0065  *.0008
Real GDP 
(1992 $US trillions)   .0414
 
*.0014  .0507  *.0014 -.0407
 
*.0048
Observations 51,810 44,147 37,008
R
2 .1304 .1800 .1227
Regressions also include information on: work status, industry (interacted with a quadratic in
age), relationship to head, and children.  See notes to previous tables.45
Table 10. Sensitivity of Risk and Insurance Effects to Macro Indicators
Dependent variable is Version 2 post-transfer income risk.  Mean .193, sd .195
Macro Variables
Group A Group B Group C
Coef.  S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Social Quota (%) .0057  *.0004 .0090  *.0007 .0014  *.0004
Unemployment Rate
(%) -.0029  *.0006 — — — —
Real GDP per capita
(1992 $US thousands) .0072  *.0004 -.0031  *.0004 .0019  *.0008
Real GDP 
(1992 $US trillions) — — .0337  *.0017 — —
Share of Exports in
GDP (%)  -.1847  *.0084 —  — -.0996  *.0086
Annual Growth in Real
GDP (%)    — — .2950  *.1192 .9602  *.1252
N: 51,810.  The regressions from which these coefficients are derived include all the variables
given in the regressions in the previous table.  See notes to previous regression tables.46
Table 11. Results from the Risk Equation in a Two-Equation System
DV: Post-Transfer Income Risk












Variable Coef.  S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Post-transfer income
a -.0595  *.0028 -.0599  *.0027 -.0706  *.0088
Age .0002  *.0001 .0002  *.0001 .0002  *.0001
Sex = female .0008 .0026 .0018 .0025 .0019 .0025
Did the respondent
change households in
past year = yes 
.0951  *.0067 .0944  *.0067 .0913  *.0071
MACRO VARIABLES
Social Quota (%) .0372  *.0009 .0367  *.0009 .0373  *.0011
Unemployment (%) -.0260  *.0008 -.0255  *.0008 -.0258  *.0009
Real GDP per capita
(1992 $US thousands)
-.0169  *.0005 -.0165  *.0005 -.0160  *.0006
Real GDP 
(1992 $US trillions)
.1222  *.0028 .1208  *.0028 .1231  *.0034
R
2 .1195 .1167 .1157
N: 51,810.  Regressions based on income Version 2.  Regressions also include information on:
work status, household structure, relationship to head, and children.  See notes to previous tables. 
a) The standard single-equation risk regression breaks post-transfer income into pre-transfer
income and transfer income, and also adds a squared term in pre-transfer income.  All of these
income variables would be endogenous in the multiple-equation setting, so they have been
collapsed into the single post-transfer income variable.  This allows for a simple two-equation
system in income risk and permanent income (referred to as “income mean” in the text).47
Figure 1. The Opportunity Set48
Figure 2. The Transfer Expansion Line49
Figure 3. The Balanced Budget Line and Transfer Expansion Lines50
Figure 4. The Effect of Increasing Redistribution on Risk-Taking51
1. In Bird (1995b) I compare two countries, Germany and the US, finding that pre-transfer risks
are much higher in Germany than in the US.  But the German welfare state had a much larger
impact on these risks, so that post-transfer risks were remarkably similar in the two countries. 
Although it considers only two countries, the study is consistent with the idea that the Welfare
State induces larger pre-transfer risks and then reduces them via the insurance effect, so that post-
transfer risk may be higher or lower.
2. The data contain no information about tax payments.  Pre-transfer income is income before
taxes and transfers.  
3.  In the Sinn model, a nonlinear f(e) function allows the slope of the opportunity set to change. 
Given any reasonable preferences, however, the agent’s choice will occur on the positively-sloped
segment of the set.  To make sure the comparative statics here refer only to choices on this part of
the set, * will be constrained to ensure a positive slope.  In effect I am linearizing the feasible,
positively-sloped segment of the opportunity set.
4. It is assumed that loss-reduction expenses e are taken from pre-tax income.  Sinn motivates the
‘loss-prevention’ activity as the reallocation of time from market labor to the education of
children.  In any case the assumption is a simplification, not necessary for any of the results.
5. Declining absolute risk aversion would indicate a TEL whose slope becomes greater in
expected value as µ rises.
6. Since we are not estimating the reaction of individuals to the risks they face, the distinction
between permanent and transitory shocks is not particularly important.  Both types of shocks
contribute to income variance in a given period, and it is the combined variance that is of interest. 
It is not clear, for example, whether the risk-taking that the Welfare State may or may not induce
will be more in the nature of shocks to permanent income (long-run risky investments) or to
transitory income (one-shot gambles).  Fortunately the distinction, which would in any case be
difficult to model, is not central to the main questions about the relationship between the overall
levels of income risk that people choose and the level of redistribution.
Also, the random effects method for estimating permanent income and total income risk is
common; see for example Kazarosian (1997) or Carroll and Samwick (1995).
7. For example: A typical log income shock estimate might indicate a standard error of 0.15,
meaning that in 95 percent of the years income does not change by more than 30 percent in either
direction.
8. See Hsiao (1986), pp. 57-63.  
9. Some of the results seem to suggest that reverse causation is not a severe problem; see below.
Endnotes
 52
10. The datasets available in the PACO group are: the German Socio-Economic Panel, the British
Household Panel Study, the Lorraine Panel Study, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the
Luxembourg Household Panel Study, the Hungarian Household Panel Study, and the Polish
Household Panel.  Interested researchers can contact the Panel Comparability Project at
http://www.ceps.lu.  
11. Future releases will include Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.  
12. Limiting the sample to working-age people by removing the elderly had no significant impact
on the results.
13. A competing hypothesis is that the PACO data are simply not well harmonized.  One test
would be to compare the dummies on the more troublesome eastern countries to those of the
more easily harmonized western countries.  The eastern dummies are indeed bigger in absolute
value, but intuitively so; the eastern socialist economies were in some ways designed to minimize
income risk.  More importantly, the difference between, say, the Polish dummy and the
Luxembourg dummies is smaller than that between the Luxembourg dummies and the UK
dummy.  That is, interpreting the evidence as indicative of harmonizing problems leads one to
conclude that it was more difficult to harmonize the UK and Luxembourg than Poland and
Luxembourg, which seems very unlikely.  It seems comparatively more reasonable to believe that
the dummies indicate real differences in the level of risk across these very diverse socio-economic
systems.
14.  With seven countries and ten samples, no more than nine country characteristics can be
identified, and no more than seven can be identified robustly.  When some countries are dropped
from the analysis (to test for the sensitivity of results to their presence), the admissible number of
country characteristics falls still more.  In running various regressions, it was always the case that
four country-level effects could be reliably estimated; with five or more, there were occasional
problems (e.g. ridiculously large standard errors).  
On a conceptual level, however, four country-level variables can control for the national
aspects of greatest interest in determining risk.  The main question of the paper is the risk effect of
social spending, so the spending share in GDP is important to include always.  The other three
most important macro-level characteristics are not very controversial: one would want a measure
of the economy’s overall per capita wealth, a measure of its recent growth, and a measure of its
susceptibility to external shocks.  So a base-case regression might include the social quota, real
GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, and aggregate real GDP.
15. It should be noted that the samples are taken at different time periods, so an omitted variable
throughout the analysis is the state of the world economy at different times.  Ideally to account for
this effect one would want comparable cross-national panel data at the same time, but they are
simply not available across a sufficiently large number of economies to allow identification of
country-level effects.53
16. A number of different identifying assumptions were tried without any substantive impact on
the results.